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Abstract 
The purpose of this master thesis is to use game theory to analyse global warming in a world 
consisting of three countries. The three countries are China, USA and EU, who currently 
accounts for more than 50% of carbon emissions. The first part models the countries’ 
payoffs according to different levels of participation and abatement. The second part 
analyses the results and combines this with game theory under different scenarios. After 
discussing the Nash equilibrium and the efficient solution, both in a cooperative and a 
noncooperative environment, I move on to see how these results fit with what we observe in 
the real world.  
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 1. Introduction 
To sustain an environment suitable for man, we must fight on a thousand battlegrounds. 
Despite all of our wealth and knowledge, we cannot create a redwood forest, a wild river, or 
a gleaming seashore. But we can keep these we have.  
Lyndon B. Johnson 
February 23, 1966 
 
Global warming is one of our times largest challenges. The International Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) argues that we need to curb carbon emissions to avoid changing the climate 
in ways that may seriously harm the earth. This will have huge economic impacts that will 
affect people’s lives tremendously. The figure below is a combination of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) scenario analysis and Helge Drange’s 
comments on this matter.  
 
We see that an increase in the average temperature of 3˚C or more by 2100 will lead to 
irreversible changes. These changes may impose effects such as rising sea level and more 
extreme weather such as drought and hurricanes.  However, if we carry on with business as 
IPCC temperature scenarios. Source: Helge Drange, lecture NHH, 14.09.09 
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usual we may have an increase in the average temperature of more than 4˚C. This will result 
in even more dramatic economic consequences.  
A different path, like the one suggested by EU, will hopefully result in an increased 
temperature of only 2˚C compared to the temperature in 1850. As Drange argues, this 
requires more than a “50% reduction of global emissions by 2050, and much larger 
reductions thereafter” (2009). In other words, this is a very optimistic scenario which will be 
difficult to reach.   
The International Energy Agency (IEA) states in World Energy Outlook 2009: “The 
reductions in energy-related CO2 emissions required in the 450 Scenario (…) by 2020 – just 
a decade away – are formidable (2009:7).”  Where the 450 scenario relates to reducing 
emissions so the long term concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere does not exceed 450 
ppm. With a CO2 concentration lower than the limit, it is a 50% probability that the global 
temperature increase will be below 2˚C. From this we may conclude that it is urgent that we 
deviate from the current path.  
Since the industrial revolution in the late 18th century, carbon emissions have been highly 
correlated with economic growth. The demand for energy production has been ever 
increasing and the most common energy source has been fossil fuels. The greenhouse effect 
was proposed as early as in 1824 by Joeph Fourier and later explained by Svante Arrhenius 
in 1896. But in the beginning, carbon emissions were not thought of as being especially 
dangerous for the environment. However, in the late 1980s global warming caught the 
scientists and environmentalists attention. Ultimately, the politicians’ concern about the 
environment grew as well.  
In 1992 the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change was formed. This is 
an international climate treaty aimed at reducing global warming, but it does not specifically 
state how the reductions are to be reached. Therefore there have been several negotiations of 
additional protocols over the last two decades, aimed at solving the how-question.  
Many saw it as a breakthrough when the Kyoto Protocol was presented in 1997. This 
Protocol is, as the UNFCC states on its homepage, “an international and legally binding 
agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions worldwide”. However, in many ways it 
turned out to be an agreement not reaching its ambitions. Both because USA, at the time the 
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largest emitter of CO2, did not ratify the agreement and because many of the developing 
countries, China included, did not have to do any large emission reductions on their own.   
1.1 Topic 
International Environmental Treaties so far have not been able to achieve large participation 
and emission reductions. Considering a world consisting of 200 countries, it is easy to 
understand as all countries have their own interests they want to protect. During the 
negotiations in Copenhagen 2009 we saw a new situation emerging where the plenum 
negotiations were partly abandoned for smaller group negotiations. In the beginning of the 
negotiations a text later called the “Danish text”, was leaked. The text proposed a climate 
treaty negotiated by, according to the Guardian (20.12.2009), “a few rich countries in 
secret”. The text received much critique and was later abandoned. However, towards the end 
of the negotiations a small group of 30 countries, consisting of most of the largest emitters, 
negotiated on their own and agreed on what was to become the Copenhagen Accord.  
Considering this new situation, it is interesting to ask the question: If we have a smaller 
group of countries, is it easier to agree on a treaty with large participation and emission 
reductions? In this paper I will therefore address this question in detail. I will simplify by 
assuming that the world only consists of three countries, China, USA and EU. I will then 
develop a model that predicts the countries’ payoffs according to different levels of 
participation. Using game theory, I will then discuss why it is difficult to reach full 
participation and if it is possible at all.  
There are three ways to deal with climate change, abatement, geoengineering and adaption. 
According to political discussions abatement is the most suggested solution to the challenge 
of global warming and this will be the focus of this paper. It should also be noticed that the 
IPCC’s research regarding climate change and whether mankind is responsible for these 
changes could be questioned. However, in the following I will assume that the IPCC is right, 
that climate change is manmade and that we can reduce global warming by investing in 
abatement. Before I move on to analysing why countries behave in the way they do, I will 
give a more detailed description of the climate problem and international environmental 
treaties.  
 8 
  
1.2 Public goods 
Public goods are characterized by being non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Non-rivalrous 
means that one individual’s consumption of a good does not affect any other individual’s 
ability to consume the good. Non-excludable meaning that it is impossible to exclude anyone 
from consumption of the good. In our case the current climate is a public good. It is not 
possible to exclude anyone from consumption of the climate and if I consume climate, that 
does not affect any other people’s consumption of the same climate.  
In lack of a world government, global public goods are especially difficult to handle. If 
climate change was a local problem, for instance domestic, the local government could have 
introduced measures to change current behaviour. Through taxation or legislation, costs may 
be imposed on different domestic players to significantly change their behaviour. This is 
unfortunately more difficult when we are addressing a global problem as we don’t have a 
world government who can impose such measures on other free states. Countries maximize 
their own welfare which may lead to global inefficient solutions as externalities are not 
incorporated in the decision-making process. Each country has incentives to free ride on 
other countries’ emission reductions. According to Asheim et al (2006:95) “there are two 
types of incentives for free riding: the incentive for a country to not sign the agreement (…) 
and the incentive for a signatory to not comply”. Due to this volunteerism, corrections of the 
global problem must be introduced through voluntary measures. This fact suggests that it is 
much more difficult to achieve broad participation and significant changes in current 
behavior.   
1.3 International environmental agreements 
According to Barrett (2003: 133) a climate treaty may be defined as: “Cooperative 
arrangements for managing shared environmental resources”. A treaty is legally binding on 
its participants, but it is of course voluntary to sign and ratify a treaty. What a treaty is trying 
to do is to restructure the game between nations, making it possible to reach the efficient 
solution and maximizing global welfare.  
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It is also worth mentioning that the treaty first is signed by a country, but this only signals a 
country’s intentions, not their actual participation. A country is not a participant before the 
treaty is ratified. Often the signing is made on behalf of the government, while the 
ratification is done by the Parliament or similar institution. This introduces a new two-staged 
game between those who signs the treaty and those who ratify it. This is an interesting 
observation, but it will not be further explored in this paper.  
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2. Theory and presentation of model: 
In this section, I will explain why different countries act the way they do when they address 
the question of global warming. I will use cooperative game theory to model how the 
different players behave under different scenarios. In the first section, I will present the 
theoretic framework, before I describe the model and assumptions. We then move on to 
parameterization and results. In the last section, I will look at the sensitivity analysis and 
discuss of how the results fit with reality.  
2.1 Theoretic framework 
Let us now turn to the theoretical framework applied in this paper. To describe countries’ 
behaviour we will use classic game theory. A game is defined by Pindyck and Rubinfeld 
(2005:474) as a “situation in which players (participants) make strategic decisions that take 
into account other’s actions and response”. Every strategy has different outcomes, or 
payoffs, and the players seek to maximize their own payoffs. The outcome of the game is the 
result of the actual strategies chosen by the players. A dominant strategy is recognized as a 
player using one specific strategy no matter what the other players do. An equilibrium is 
defined by Barrett (2003:57) as “an outcome where no player would prefer to deviate, given 
the choices made by other players”. 
Information is an important aspect when it comes to game theory. In line with the 
assumptions made by Barrett (2003) I will look at the game as a game of imperfect 
information. This means that each player acts without knowing how the other players will 
act. On the other hand, what he does know is the payoffs the other players are facing under 
different outcomes. This is known as complete information and the player can make a 
qualified prediction about other players’ strategies. In addition to this, let us assume that all 
players know that the other players know, or in other words, the information is common 
knowledge.  
An equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium if all players are doing the best they can given what the 
other players are doing. The Nash equilibrium is then the expected solution of the game. 
However, the Nash equilibrium is not always the global optimum or what is also called the 
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efficient solution. The global optimum is the outcome that maximizes the joint payoffs. 
Since every player is maximising their own payoffs we can have a situation where the 
behaviour leads to a non-efficient solution. This may be what we know as “tragedy of the 
commons”, or a situation where maximisation of self interest results in depletion of a shared 
resource, for instance the environment, even if this is not in the collective interest. 
Sometimes, we have games with more than one Nash equilibrium. In such a situation, it is 
interesting to observe how the players can agree on one particular equilibrium. In 1960, 
Thomas Schelling introduced the theory of focal points, or a solution that stands out among 
many and therefore is the natural solution. He describes focal points as “each person’s 
expectation of what the other expects him to expect to be expected to do” (1960:57). The 
illustrative example Schelling used is, if you were to meet at stranger in New York City the 
next day, where and when would you meet this person? Using Schelling’s definition of focal 
points, you would expect the other person to expect that you expect that meeting at Grand 
Central Station at noon is the best solution. This is because Grand Central Station is a 
common meeting place and noon is a time of day standing out from all others. In later 
sections we will have a closer look at how focal points may affect the expected equilibrium.  
We also distinguish between cooperative and noncooperative games. Pindyck and Rubinfeld 
(2005:474) define a cooperative game as a “game in which participants can negotiate 
binding contracts that allow them to plan joint strategies”. This can for instance be achieved 
by an international environmental treaty. While in noncooperative games, the players are not 
allowed to negotiate at all. In the following we will look at both situations and we will see 
that a treaty may improve the equilibrium in some scenarios.  
When discussing a cooperative game, profit sharing or side payments are important to 
determine if we can find a solution that is stable. Side payments are defined as a transfer of 
money from some members of the coalition to other members of the coalition. A stable 
solution is also known as the solution being a part of the core. Narahari (2009) has defined 
the core as “the set of payoff allocations that are individually rational, coalitionally rational, 
and collectively rational”. In other words, a solution which is the efficient solution and no 
single player or coalition wants to leave the grand coalition. The core can be empty and non-
empty. An empty core means that there are no possible solutions in the core, while a non-
empty core means that there are one or more possible solutions. 
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If the core is non-empty there are many ways to share the profits to find a solution that may 
be within the core. Here I will describe two interesting methods, the Shapley value and the 
Gamma core. The Shapley value is a fair way of sharing payoffs from cooperation because it 
assigns a payoff equal to their average marginal contribution to cooperation. The idea is that 
we look at all the coalitions that can be formed, and ask ourselves the question: If one 
particular player is included in the coalition, what is the marginal contribution to increased 
total payoffs? The answer is the profit that should be allocated to this country. Obviously, 
the marginal contribution depends on in which order countries are allowed into the coalition. 
Therefore, the Shapley Value takes the average marginal contributions over all orders and 
coalitions that can be formed. This provides us with a unique solution, but as Barrett 
(2003:344) points out “this value may not lie in the core of the game”. 
Profit sharing based on the Gamma core was introduced by Chander and Tulkens (1994). It 
is an appealing method because the solution is in the core of the game, the solution is unique 
and it is easy to find. The Gamma core shares the profits from moving from the Nash 
equilibrium to the grand coalition. The profit sharing is a payment to each player that covers 
their increase in costs between the Nash equilibrium and the optimum. In addition to this, 
each player has to pay a share of the world’s total increase in costs equal to their share of 
marginal damages. In an extreme example, this means that a country with no marginal 
damages will be compensated for their increase in costs due to participation. This makes it 
individually rational for this country to participate, because the country can not do any better 
on its own. A country with high marginal damages on the other hand will receive an amount 
equal to their increased costs, but they will also have to pay a share of the total increased 
costs. In sum this may lead to a situation where the countries highly affected by climate 
change will transfer money to countries not harmed. Or in other words, the method exploits 
the high willingness to pay by the highly affected countries, in order to compensate the 
countries with low willingness to pay. The theory also assumes full knowledge of the 
damage- and abatement cost functions. Chander and Tulkens also comments that the results 
are obtained “under two alternative assumptions: either linearity of the damage cost 
functions (…) or identical abatement cost functions (…) for all countries” (1994:10). In the 
model presented here the damage cost functions are non-linear, but the abatement cost 
functions are similar for all countries. As we will see later, the Gamma core provides an 
efficient solution.  
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2.2 Modelling payoffs: 
The payoff to country i is the net present value of the net consumption and it is calculated as 
follows:  
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This is in other words the sum of net consumption in every period until T. At this point we 
assume a normalisation and we calculate a terminal value using Gordon’s growth model and 
discounted to today. k is the discount rate and tig is the growth rate in country i in period t. 
The net consumption per capita equals the GDP minus capital investments, mitigation costs 
and the country’s share of potential world damages, divided by the size of the population. 
This can be shown as: 
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where tir is the share of GDP invested, also known as the savings rate in country i in period t. 
t
iq  is the abatement cost to country i in period t and this variable is assumed to be binary. In 
other words, a country can either invest the necessary amount in abatement or they do 
nothing. The last term is the country’s share of the total damages from global warming. 
Where is is country’s share and the damages is calculated as follows: 
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Here ta is the rate of damages in period t. tu is the rate of necessary investment to insure the 
world against climate damages. In other words, the damages to the world are equal to a share 
of GDP multiplied with factor depending on the investments made by the countries of the 
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world. The factor is equal to the amount necessary to invest to prevent climate change less 
what is actual invested by the countries of the world, divided by the necessary investment 
amount, where ∑
=
−− =
I
i
t
i
t
w GDPGDP
1
11 is last years world GDP . This factor is equal to zero if 
all countries participate and invests in mitigation and it is 1 if no countries participate. The 
damage function is also assumed to be non-linear, where α is the damage coefficient 
( 1≥α ). The population size is calculated as 1−= tititi PvP , where tiv  is the population growth 
rate in country i in period t multiplied with last years population size.  
 
It is important to notice that I have modelled climate damages and mitigation costs as a 
reduction in consumption, not a reduction in GDP. This means that the growth path for 
output is not affected by any costs imposed by climate change or abatement.  
 
The world’s total payoff is then equal to the sum of all countries’ payoff, or in other words:  
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The model is summarized mathematically in Appendix 1. 
 
The model described above differs from much of the other literature on the subject of global 
warming and international environmental agreements as it does not include the variables of 
temperature and CO2 emissions. However, in the discussion of parameters below I will use 
findings from different scientists who have used temperature in their models. It is also worth 
mentioning that during the financial turmoil in 2008-09 the International Energy Agency 
observed a drop in emissions in addition to a drop in GDP due to lower activity. We may 
therefore assume that GDP and emissions are highly correlated and that this relationship will 
hold in the model described above. 
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2.3 Parameterization 
I have decided to model a world consisting of only three “countries”, China, USA and EU. 
These countries are the three largest emitters of CO2, with China being the largest emitter, 
USA second and EU third. According to numbers from the United Nations Statistics 
Division these three countries amounted to 55.5% of all carbon emissions in 2006. The 
behaviour of these three countries is therefore crucial when discussing climate policy 
because their actions have huge impact on the aggregated world emissions.  
 
In the Stern Review released in 2006 by Sir Nicholas Stern, he argues for urgent and large 
mitigation to reduce the risk of climate change. His argument is based on a modelling of cost 
and benefits from climate change. He has found that if we invest up to 1% of GDP annually 
by 2050, we can with high certainty insure the world against non-reversible climate change 
(Stern, 2006: 13). If we, on the other hand, don’t invest in mitigation, and carry on with 
business as usual, “climate change will reduce welfare by an amount equivalent to a 
reduction in consumption per head of between 5 and 20%, now and into the future”(Stern, 
2006: 10).  
 
Another economist who has modelled the economic impacts of climate change, is William 
Nordhaus who has developed the model: Regional Integrated model of Climate and the 
Economy (RICE model).  In his paper Economic Aspects of Global Warming in a Post-
Copenhagen Environment (2010: 11) he states: “[under the Copenhagen Accord c]osts rise 
gradually over the coming decades and reach around 1 percent of national income for high-
income countries in the late 21st century.” The Copenhagen Accord is believed to be a weak 
treaty that will not contribute to achieve the necessary emission reductions to prevent the 
world from significant damages. It is also interesting to note that Nordhaus suggests a ramp 
up of abatement costs over time.  
Combining the results from Stern and Nordhaus I have decided on the following parameters 
for abatement costs: 
Period 2009-2055 2056-2075 2076-2105 2106- 
Abatement cost in % of GDP 0.5 % 1 % 1 % 0 % 
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The necessary investments in abatement are 0.5% of world GDP from now to 2055. From 
2056 to 2105 it is 1% of GDP. After this period the necessary investments are zero. This is 
in line with the assumption above that the society will be transformed into a low-carbon 
society in 2105 (=T).  As mentioned above, a country’s investment in abatement is a binary 
variable equal to zero if it plays Pollute. If the country plays Abate the investment in 
abatement equals 0.5 % of GDP per year from 2009-2055 and 1% of GDP per year from 
2056-2105. I also assume that any country can achieve efficient mitigation at the same prices 
anywhere in the world. In other words, it does not matter who invests in mitigation, only the 
aggregated amount invested is important.  
 
When building a model of different scenarios with payoffs far into the future, the discount 
rate will have a deep impact on the results. Stern’s report on climate change and the need of 
urgent actions has been highly discussed by Dasgupta (2006) and Nordhaus (2007). They 
have shown that Stern’s results are different, for instance from Nordhaus’ results, due to a 
significantly low discount rate.  When using Nordhaus’ discount rate combined with Stern’s 
model, the results are more or less the same. I will therefore start out by using a discount rate 
of 4 % suggested by Nordhaus as an expected average for this century (2008:10). According 
to Kenneth Arrow: “Stern’s fundamental conclusion is justified (…) even if, unlike Stern, 
one heavily discounts uncertainty and the future” (2007), the assumption of investments as 
an insurance from climate change and potential expensive damages therefore still holds.  The 
discount rate is assumed to be equal to all countries. One could argue that the discount factor 
should reflect real return on capital in the different countries and that China therefore should 
have a higher discount rate compared to USA and EU. However, as we will see below, the 
growth rate of China will decline to the same level as the growth rate in USA and EU at 
approximately the same time as the costs of climate change occur. We may therefore believe 
that the same will happen to the real return on capital. The assumption of using the same 
discount rates will therefore not have any significant impacts on the results.  
 
At what time costs occur, will significantly affect the results in the model. Using a high 
discount rate means that costs far into the future will have little impact on the net present 
value (NPV). Abatement costs are more uncertain and we cannot know for sure when they 
occur. They may be large from the middle of this century or from the end of it. For now, it is 
important to notice that the discount rate may affect the results significantly.  
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When it comes to growth rates for different countries I have used the same growth rates as 
Nordhaus has used in the RICE model for growth of net national income (2010:5). 
Nordhaus’ estimates are until 2205 and I have assumed that the last period estimated, 2105-
2205, will be relevant from 2106 and forever. The growth rates are summarized in the 
following table:  
Growth of net 
national income 2009-2055 2056-2075 2076-2105 2106- 
China 3.91 % 1.26 % 1.26 % 0.30 % 
USA 2.04 % 1.08 % 1.08 % 0.29 % 
EU 1.86 % 0.90 % 0.90 % 0.29 % 
 
In the first period we have higher growth in China compared to USA and EU. From then, 
China’s growth rate drops and becomes close to identical with the growth in the two other 
countries. This is expected since China is experiencing significant growth at the moment, but 
this growth will probably decline as GDP per capita becomes close to GDP per capita in 
other developed countries. 
 
Initial data for GDP, population and emissions are summarized in the following table:  
 China USA EU 
Total/World/World 
average 
GDP PPP (billions) $ (2009 est.) 8791 14260 14510 37561
Population (millions) (2010 est.) 1338.6 307.2 491.6 2137.4
GDP/capita $ (2009 est.) 6500 46400 32700   
Emissions       
Thousand metric tons of CO2 (2006) 6103493 5752289 3914359 15770141
Share of real world total (2006) 21.5 % 20.2 % 13.8 % 55.5 %
Metric tons of carbon emissions per 
capita (2006) 4.6 19.0 8.1 4.4
 
The GDP numbers are gathered from the CIA Factbook and show that USA and EU are 
significantly larger economies compared to China. But remember that China has a higher 
growth rate and they will therefore catch up some time before 2050. China is much more 
populous compared to USA and EU and we therefore see that the GDP per capita is much 
lower than the two others.  
 
China is the largest emitter of CO2, closely followed by USA. EU is lagging somewhat 
behind and is only responsible for 13.8% of real world total. The three countries’ emissions 
amounts to a share of 55.5% of world total and, as mentioned above, these countries actions 
will significantly affect total world emissions. China emits much less CO2 per capita 
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compared to USA. While EU is between the two, with 8.1 tons of CO2 per capita. The world 
average is only 4.4 tons of CO2 per capita and we see that China is close to this average, 
while EU and especially USA are high above the average.  
 
Let’s now turn to historic cumulative emissions. From Baumert et al. (2005) we have the 
following numbers:  
Historic CO2 emissions 
(1850-2002)     
Country Cumulative emissions Tripod-world 
China 7.6 % 12.0 %
USA 29.3 % 46.2 %
EU 26.5 % 41.8 %
ROW 36.6 %   
Sum 100.0 % 100.0 %
 
Baumert et al. have summarized all emissions since 1850 to 2002 and found that USA is 
responsible for 29.3% of total aggregated emissions in this period. Closely followed by EU, 
who has emitted 26.5%. China is only responsible for 7.6% of the total emissions in the 
period. Since we in this world, only have three players, we may recalculate the percentages. 
Now China is responsible for 12% of cumulative emissions, USA 46.2% and EU 41.8%.  
 
As mentioned above, consumption equals GDP minus invested capital. Here the invested 
capital is the same as the savings rate times GDP. The savings rates for the different 
countries are collected from Nordhaus’ RICE-model and they are summarized in the 
following table:  
Savings rate 2009 - 2015 2016 - 2025 2026 - 2035 2036 - 2045 2046 – 2055 2056 - 2065
China 35.70 % 22.70 % 21.50 % 20.80 % 20.40 % 20.50 %
USA 17.80 % 20.40 % 20.10 % 19.80 % 19.70 % 19.80 %
EU 17.40 % 20.00 % 19.60 % 19.50 % 19.30 % 19.40 %
  2066 - 2075 2076 - 2085 2086 - 2095 2096 - 2105 2106 -  
China 20.40 % 20.50 % 20.50 % 21.10 % 21.70 % 
USA 20.00 % 20.30 % 20.50 % 20.80 % 22.10 % 
EU 19.50 % 19.70 % 19.90 % 20.60 % 22.00 % 
 
In the first period China’s savings rate is higher compared to USA and EU, but over time it 
declines and at the end of the century, the savings rates are more or less equivalent.   
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Let us have a look at the population growth in the different countries. These numbers are 
also from Nordhaus’ RICE-model and they are shown in the following table:  
Population growth 2009 - 2015 2016 - 2025 2026 - 2035 2036 - 2045 2046 - 2055 2056 - 2065
China 0.6186 % 0.6186 % 0.4012 % 0.0632 % -0.1520 % -0.3289 %
USA 0.9328 % 0.9328 % 0.7646 % 0.5760 % 0.4318 % 0.2463 %
EU 0.4346 % 0.4346 % 0.2358 % 0.0966 % -0.0001 % -0.1551 %
  2066 - 2075 2076 - 2085 2086 - 2095 2096 - 2105 2106 -  
China -0.3325 % -0.3325 % -0.3325 % -0.3325 % -0.1582 % 
USA 0.1346 % 0.1346 % 0.1346 % 0.1346 % 0.1035 % 
EU -0.2382 % -0.2382 % -0.2382 % -0.2382 % -0.0971 % 
 
China’s population growth is somewhat lower than the others. This is probably due to the 
effective politics aimed at reducing the birth rate. The population growth in USA is higher 
than in EU. For China and EU, the population growth is negative in the second part of the 
century. 
 
Each country will have a share of the total costs in proportion to their share of marginal 
damages. Using Nordhaus’ RICE model, Godal and Holtsmark have suggested marginal 
damages for the different countries in 2020 as follows (2010: 9). I have assumed that each 
country’s share of world total is consistent from now and into the future. This is summarized 
in the following table:  
Year 2020 
Marginal 
damage 
(US$/tC) 
Share of 
world total 
( is ) 
China 24.3 41.26 %
US 15.1 25.64 %
EU 19.5 33.11 %
Sum world 58.9 100.00 %
 
I have assumed the share of marginal damages to be constant for every time period. 
However, it is important to notice that the share of marginal damages may change over time, 
especially due to economic growth. Today China has the largest share of marginal damages 
and it is possible that this is due to lower GDP compared to the other countries. As we have 
seen above, China has a higher growth rate and they will catch up with the rest of the world 
within 2050. One could argue that China today is more affected by climate change because 
many people are rural workers. When they grow richer, more people will have other jobs, for 
instance to the service industry, and they will therefore be less affected by climate change. 
However, if we look at consumption per capita, it will take much longer time before China 
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catches up with USA and EU. I have therefore assumed constant shares of marginal 
damages.  
 
The damage coefficient ensures that the damage function is nonlinear. The coefficient is 
larger than one and in the following analysis I will assume it to be equal to 1.5. A coefficient 
larger than 1, indicates that some abatement is a lot better than no abatement and that there 
are diminishing marginal benefit of abatement. In the sensitivity analysis, I will also look at 
what happens if the coefficient is changed.  
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3. Scenarios and results 
We have now looked at the theoretic framework, the model and its parameters. Let us now 
turn to the results considering different scenarios. As mentioned above, there are large 
uncertainties about many of the parameters in our model. Perhaps the most important 
parameter that we are highly uncertain about, is the damage costs. I have therefore decided 
to look at what happens if the damage costs change and especially which coalitions will 
form. Firstly, I will analyse damages of 5% of consumption from 2056 and then increase the 
damages to 12.5%. There are two 12.5%-scenarios with different discount rates. This 
illustrates the importance of the value of the discount rate and how it affects the results.  
3.1 Scenario 1: Damages = 5% of consumption,  
discount rate = 4% 
In the first scenario, the damages are 5% of consumption from 2056 and forever. The results 
and some important parameters are summarized in the following table:  
Period 2009-2055 2056-2075 2076-2105 2106-     
World damages in % of GDP 0.0 % 5.0 % 5.0 % 5.0 %     
Damage coefficient 1.50           
Discount rate (k) 4.0 %           
       
Coalition Total payoff V(u)-V(Ø) China USA EU   
V(CH, EU) 2 656 317 23 452 369 225 1 347 509 939 583 Efficient solution 
V(CH, US) 2 654 404 21 539 369 413 1 338 101 946 891   
V(CH, US, EU) 2 652 928 20 062 370 469 1 340 173 942 286   
V(CH) 2 652 925 20 059 367 220 1 343 579 942 125 Nash equilibrium 
V(US, EU) 2 644 340 11 475 371 191 1 335 772 937 378   
V(EU) 2 640 659 7 794 368 566 1 340 416 931 676   
V(US) 2 639 326 6 460 368 869 1 331 226 939 231   
V(Ø) 2 632 866 0 365 703 1 334 809 932 353   
 
The first column describes the different coalitions and they are ranked by their total payoffs. 
Total payoff refers to the payoff to the total utility to the world and it is the sum of all 
countries’ payoff. The next column describes the respective coalitions’ improvement 
compared to the business as usual path where no one abates. The next three columns show 
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the individual payoffs to the countries under different coalitions. The largest individual 
payoff to each country is marked yellow. 
The total payoff is maximized when China and EU are in a coalition investing in abatement. 
This is the efficient solution, also known as the global optimum or the solution that 
maximises the world’s utility. The second best alternative for the world is a coalition of 
China and US, while the grand coalition is a third best option. It is also interesting to notice 
that all countries’ individual payoffs are at their highest when they free ride and let a 
coalition of the two other countries abate. China abating alone has a higher total payoff 
compared to the coalition of US and EU. This is probably due to China’s higher growth rates 
and marginal damages.   
Next, we turn to the Nash equilibrium. Remember that the Nash equilibrium is defined as a 
situation where no player wants to change their behavior given the behavior of the other 
players. I have used the following matrix to illustrate how to find the Nash equilibrium when 
we have three players:  
EU choose 
Abate 
 
US 
  Abate Pollute 
Abate (370, 1340, 942) (369, 1347, 936) 
China 
Pollute (371, 1335, 937) (368, 1340, 931) 
EU choose 
Pollute  US 
  Abate Pollute 
Abate (369, 1338, 946) (367, 1343, 942)   * 
China 
Pollute (368, 1331, 939) (365, 1334, 932) 
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We exclude EU from the matrix, but include their payoffs. The different outcomes show the 
individual payoffs to each country in the following order (China, US, EU). The arrows show 
how each player acts to maximize their own payoffs. We see that China will play abate in all 
outcomes except when US and EU are in a coalition. US on the other hand has a dominant 
strategy to play pollute. The solution must therefore be in one of the upper right hand 
corners. Or in other words, EU must choose between abate or pollute given that USA will 
pollute and China will abate. To maximize their payoff EU will choose pollute. The Nash 
equilibrium (marked *) is then the solution where China abates alone, while the other two 
are free riders. If we check for the two other situations where China and US are excluded 
from the matrix we get the same result.  
The Nash equilibrium is a relative improvement of 0.76% compared to the business as usual 
total payoffs and the efficient solution is a relative improvement of 0.89%. In other words, it 
is possible to improve total payoffs by moving from the Nash equilibrium to the efficient 
solution, but the additional gains are not very large. Meanwhile, it is interesting to have a 
closer look at whether it is possible to reach the efficient solution and maximize total payoffs 
at all. The solution described above is attained in the non-cooperative environment. But what 
if we let the players use side payments to improve the situation? The efficient solution is the 
coalition consisting of China and EU, but in this coalition EU will want to break out as they 
will receive higher payoffs by free riding. When including side payments China could be 
willing to pay EU for staying in the coalition, but is the increased payoffs large enough to 
sustain the efficient solution?  
The following table summarizes the changes in payoffs for the different countries when 
moving from the Nash equilibrium to the efficient solution.  
Coalition Total payoff China USA EU   
V(CH, EU) 2 656 317 369 225 1 347 509 939 583 
Efficient 
solution 
V(CH) 2 652 925 367 220 1 343 579 942 125 
Nash 
equilibrium 
Change in payoffs 3 393 2 005 3 930 2 542   
 
China is willing to pay EU up to $ 2005 billions. Paying more than this is not in the interest 
of China, as they can do better when abating alone. The coalition between EU and China will 
only be in the interest of EU if they are paid at least $ 2542 billions. Remember that side 
payments are defined as money transfers between countries in the coalition, the efficient 
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solution is therefore not possible because the necessary payment to EU is larger than China’s 
total gain. Only if USA is willing to pay EU the efficient solution is possible. This is 
reflected in the positive change in total payoffs. However, this situation is much more 
difficult to achieve, as one country is free riding and at the same time paying another country 
to abate. This is probably politically controversial both in USA and EU and can be difficult 
to achieve when the additional gains are small.  
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3.2 Scenario 2: Damages = 12.5% of consumption,  
discount rate = 4% 
Stern suggests that potential damages could reduce consumption by 5-20%. The first 
scenario was therefore a low damage costs estimate. What happens if the damages increase 
to 12.5% from 2056 and forever? The parameters and results are summarized in the 
following table: 
Period 2009-2055 2056-2075 2076-2105 2106-     
World damages in % of GDP 0.0 % 12.5 % 12.5 % 12.5 %     
Damage coefficient 1.50           
Discount rate (k) 4.0 %           
       
Coalition Total payoff V(u)-V(Ø) China USA EU   
V(CH, US, EU) 2 652 928 79 633 370 469 1 340 173 942 286 Efficient solution 
V(CH, EU) 2 646 751 73 455 367 359 1 343 863 935 528 Nash equilibrium 
V(CH, US) 2 646 267 72 971 367 829 1 334 993 943 445 Nash equilibrium 
V(CH) 2 627 916 54 621 362 347 1 334 039 931 530   
V(US, EU) 2 626 986 53 691 367 800 1 329 171 930 015   
V(US) 2 604 097 30 802 361 995 1 317 806 924 297   
V(EU) 2 603 132 29 836 361 240 1 326 131 915 761   
V(Ø) 2 573 295 0 354 082 1 312 113 907 100   
 
When the costs are increased we see that the grand coalition becomes the efficient solution. 
This is to be expected because a larger problem usually needs more participants to be 
corrected. China’s individual payoff is maximized in the grand coalition, while USA and EU 
maximize their individual payoffs when free riding. It is also interesting to observe that 
China abating alone gives a marginally higher total payoff compared to the coalition of USA 
and EU.  
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Finding the Nash equilibrium is shown in the following table:  
China choose Abate  
EU 
  Abate Pollute 
Abate (370, 1340, 942) (367, 1334, 943) * 
US 
Pollute (367, 1343, 935) * (362, 1334, 931) 
China choose 
Pollute  EU 
  Abate Pollute 
Abate (367, 1329, 930) (361,1317,924) 
US 
Pollute (361, 1326, 915) (354, 1312, 907) 
 
When China abates, USA’s strategy is polluting if EU abates. And if EU pollutes USA will 
want to abate. The same is true for EU. If we exclude the two other countries in turn, China 
has a dominant strategy to abate. We are therefore in the upper half of the table above where 
we have two Nash equilibria, a coalition of China and USA and a coalition of China and EU. 
From basic game theory, it is hard to distinguish between the two and predict which 
equilibrium we will end up with. 
As suggested in the theoretic framework, we may use the theory of focal points to select 
among several Nash equilibria. A focal point is a solution that stands out among others as 
more appealing. There are some differences between USA and EU that might suggest the 
most likely equilibrium. For instance, USA has much higher current emissions compared to 
EU. In a perspective of fairness, one could argue that USA should pay for abatement since 
they are a larger polluter compared to EU. However, there is little evidence that higher 
emissions lead to a higher sense of responsibility regarding climate change. Using these 
arguments, the coalition of China and USA is not very likely.  
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Another perspective is differences in marginal damages. EU has higher marginal damages 
compared to USA and they therefore have stronger incentives to prevent climate change. As 
a result, China and EU should form a coalition due to stronger incentives. Additionally, the 
total payoffs of the coalition of China and EU are marginally higher compared to the 
coalition of China and USA. Considering this, I believe it is more likely that the coalition 
between China and EU is formed. This is also in line with the results from the next scenario, 
where the coalition of China and EU is the only Nash equilibrium. This Nash equilibrium 
equals a total improvement of 2.85% compared to the business as usual case.  
Looking closer at the grand coalition, we see that both USA and EU have individual 
incentives to break out. This is shown in the table above, where both USA and EU maximize 
their payoffs by free riding, in each case letting the two remaining countries abate. This 
might suggest that the core is small or even empty. To check if the core is empty we need to 
find out if it is any solution that is collectively, coalitionally and individually rational. From 
the table above we see that the grand coalition is collectively rational since it has the highest 
total payoffs. The coalitional and individual rationality is summarized in the table below:  
Individual China USA EU Sum 
Payoff grand coalition 370 469 1 340 173 942 286   
Maximum payoff alone 367 800 1 343 863 943 445   
  2 669 -3 690 -1 159 -2 180
Coalition China, US China, EU US, EU Sum
Payoff grand coalition 1 710 642 1 312 755 2 282 459   
Maximum payoff alone 1 702 821 1 302 888 2 265 569  
  7 820 9 868 16 890 34 578
 
For the individual rationality to be fulfilled the payoff each country gets after payoff sharing 
must be larger than what it can get on its own. The difference for China between their payoff 
from the grand coalition and the maximum payoff they can get when acting alone is $ 2669 
billion. This means that China is willing to give up to $ 2669 billion and still be a part of the 
coalition. For US it is opposite, they can do much better if they act alone and so they must be 
compensated by at least $ 3690 billion, to want to stay in the grand coalition. The same is 
true fro EU, who needs a compensation of at least $ 1159 billion. The total sums of 
compensation and willingness to pay is negative, this means that the core is empty. There is, 
in other words, no possible solution that is individually rational for all countries at the same 
time.  
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Looking at coalitional rationality, the differences between the coalition’s payoffs in the 
grand coalition compared to their best alternative on their own are obvious. For the coalition 
between China and USA, they are willing to give up $ 7820 billion before they will be 
interested in breaking out of the grand coalition. We see that the same is true for the coalition 
between China and EU as well as the coalition of USA and EU. If we only consider 
coalitional rationality, a core solution is possible. But, as mentioned above, the individual 
rationality is not possible to fulfil and we therefore have an empty core.  
An empty core means that it is very difficult to find consensus for any agreement that 
provides full participation. It is not impossible, but an agreement providing full participation 
will need to be supported by other incentives than economic incentives alone. And it can be 
very difficult to ensure compliance when one or more parties have economic incentives to 
break out. For this scenario it is very difficult to improve on the Nash equilibrium and the 
efficient solution will probably not be reached. This is mostly due to the empty core. In the 
next scenario, the damage costs level is the same as here and I will analyse what happens if 
the discount rate is reduced.  
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3.3 Scenario 3: Damages = 12.5% of consumption,  
discount rate = 3% 
In this scenario, the discount rate is reduced to 3%. This means that future damages have a 
larger impact on the net present value and cooperation is expected to be more profitable. The 
results are summarized in the following table:  
Period 2009-2055 2056-2075 2076-2105 2106-     
World damages in % of GDP 0.0 % 12.5 % 12.5 % 12.5 %     
Damage coefficient 1.50           
Discount rate (k) 3.0 %           
       
Coalition Total payoff V(u)-V(Ø) China USA EU   
V(CH, US, EU) 3 992 764 191 432 631 358 1 953 499 1 407 907 Efficient solution 
V(CH, US) 3 973 295 171 963 625 513 1 942 290 1 405 492   
V(CH, EU) 3 971 619 170 288 624 385 1 954 400 1 392 835 Nash equilibrium 
V(US, EU) 3 932 604 131 272 623 337 1 929 082 1 380 185   
V(CH) 3 925 326 123 994 613 255 1 933 078 1 378 992   
V(US) 3 877 170 75 839 610 401 1 904 328 1 362 441   
V(EU) 3 872 014 70 682 608 579 1 915 144 1 348 291   
V(Ø) 3 801 332 0 592 641 1 884 637 1 324 054   
 
We see that the grand coalition is the most efficient solution. For China and EU the 
individual payoffs are maximized in the grand coalition, while the best individual strategy 
for USA is to free ride and let the two others abate. We also find that the coalitions of any 2 
countries of the 3 all provides higher total payoff than any single country’s abatement. 
The Nash equilibrium is found using the same method as before by excluding one country 
from the matrix at the time. Finding the Nash equilibrium is then shown in the following 
table:  
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China choose Abate  
EU 
  Abate Pollute 
Abate (631, 1953, 1407) (625, 1942, 1405)  
US 
Pollute (624, 1954, 1392) * (613, 1933, 1378) 
China choose 
Pollute  EU 
  Abate Pollute 
Abate (623, 1929, 1380) (610, 1904, 1362) 
US 
Pollute (608, 1915, 1348) (592, 1884, 1324) 
 
We see that EU has a dominant strategy to abate. USA will have incentives to abate only if 
EU pollutes or if China pollutes. When excluding the two remaining countries in turn we 
find that China, like EU, has a dominant strategy to play abate. The result is that we have a 
Nash equilibrium where China and EU abates, while USA pollutes. The Nash equilibrium is 
a relative improvement of 4.48% compared to the business as usual path.  
Let us now turn to the core of the game. As we can see from the table above, the grand 
coalition is collectively rational. The coalitional and individual rationality is summarized in 
the table below: 
  China USA EU Sum 
Payoff grand coalition 631358 1953499 1407907   
Maximum payoff alone 623337 1954400 1405492   
  8020 -901 2415 9534
  China, US China, EU EU, US Sum 
Payoff grand coalition 2584856 2039265 3361406   
Maximum payoff alone 2567803 2017219 3312071   
  17054 22046 49336 88435
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Individually, China will want to stay in the grand coalition as long as their payoff will not be 
reduced by more than $ 8020 billion. EU is also willing to give up some of their payoff to 
stay in the coalition and they are willing to give up $ 2415 billion at the most. USA, on the 
other hand, must be compensated for wanting to stay in the coalition. Their compensation 
must be at least $ 901 billion. In total we see that the individual rationality is possible to 
achieve since the total sum is positive.  
Considering coalitional rationality, no coalition of two countries can do any better if acting 
on their own than in the grand coalition. In other words, the payoffs to all two-countries-
coalitions are larger in the grand coalition than what they can get either by the two countries 
breaking out or forming their own two country coalition and excluding the third country.   
It is now possible to find a solution that is both coalitionally and individually rational, the 
core is therefore non-empty. Even though the core is non-empty, we are not certain to find a 
reasonable profit sharing that is in the core. There are many ways of sharing profits and in 
the following, I will describe some possible solutions and check whether they comply with 
the core.  
First, I will analyse the non-cooperative grand coalition suggested above.  
Noncooperative grand coalition China USA EU 
V(CH, US, EU) 631 358 1 953 499 1 407 907
 
The non-cooperative grand coalition is not in the core. If it had been, this would have been 
the Nash equilibrium of the game, which it is not. The reason why this solution is not in the 
core, is because with current payoffs, USA will want to break out and let the two others 
abate on their own. However, if we let the game be a cooperative game where the players 
can agree on side payments, the results may change. There are numerous ways to share the 
profits according to different profit sharing alternatives. As mentioned in the theoretic 
framework, I will go into detail on the Shapley value and the Gamma core. In addition to 
this, I have looked at other profit sharing methods such as per GDP, per capita and per 
emissions. Here, I will only present the results, for a detailed analysis of the different 
methods for payoff sharing and to see if they are in the core, see appendix 2.  
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The Shapley value is found as an average of marginal contributions to each coalition. In the 
table below we see all marginal contributions for each country: 
Coalition V(u) 
Marginal 
contribution 
China 
Marginal 
contribution 
USA 
Marginal 
contribution 
EU  Sum 
CH 3 925 326 123 994       
US 3 877 170   75 839     
EU 3 872 014     70 682   
Mean subgroup   123 994 75 839 70 682   
CH, US 3 973 295 96 124 47 969     
CH, EU 3 971 619 99 605   46 294   
US, EU 3 932 604   60 590 55 434   
Mean subgroup   97 865 54 279 50 864   
CH, US, EU 3 992 764 60 160 21 144 19 469  
Shapley value   94 006 50 421 47 005 191 432 
New payoff   686647 1935058 1371059 3 992 764 
 
The table describes all possible coalitions and the marginal contribution for each country 
when they are added into a coalition. For instance, let USA abate before China joins USA in 
a coalition to abate. Then the marginal contribution for China is equal to $ 96124 billion. 
After each subgroup of coalitions, the mean marginal cost for each country is calculated. The 
Shapley Value is the average of the subgroup means for each country. The Shapley value for 
China is then $ 94006 billion, USA $ 50421 billion and EU $ 47005 billion. This figure is 
then added to the business as usual payoffs and we get a new payoff for China equal to $ 
686647, USA $ 1935058 billion and EU $ 1371059 billion. China has the largest Shapley 
value as they contribute the most when participating in the coalitions. It is also worth 
noticing that the sum of the Shapley values is equal to the total increase in payoff when 
moving from the business as usual path to the most efficient solution. This simple exercise 
gives a unique solution which is fair in the sense of profit sharing, but is the solution in the 
core? Unfortunately, the Shapley values of this game are far from the core. Coalitionally, 
two constraints are violated. First, the coalition of USA and EU receive larger payoffs if they 
break out of the grand coalition and form their own coalition, excluding China. Second, the 
coalition of USA and EU receive even larger payoffs if they together break out and free ride, 
while China abates alone. In addition to this, they both have incentives to break out of the 
coalition and let the two remaining parties abate. The profit sharing method using Shapley 
values does not qualify as a core solution.   
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The Gamma core method was introduced by Chander and Tulkens (1994). The Gamma core 
method is based on money transfers within the grand coalition. Each player gets 
compensation for the increase in costs when moving from the Nash equilibrium to the 
efficient solution. In addition to this, they have to make a payment equal to their share of 
marginal damages multiplied with the total increase in costs. The details for each country are 
summarized in the table below:  
Abatement costs CH US EU Total 
Nash equilibrium 6 944 0 5 356 12 300 
Efficient solution 6 944 5 699 5 356 17 999 
Share of total damages 41.26 % 25.64 % 33.11 % 100 % 
Money transfer 2351 -4238 1887 0.0 
Noncooperative 631358 1953499 1407907 3 992 764 
New payoff 629 006 1 957 737 1 406 021 3 992 764 
 
A money transfer that is positive means that this country has to pay, while a negative sign 
means that this country receives money. Using the Gamma core method, China and EU must 
pay, while USA receives money. China and EU must pay because they don’t have any 
additional costs when moving from the Nash equilibrium to the efficient solution. In addition 
to this, they have a larger share of total damages compared to USA and therefore have to pay 
a larger share of the increase in total costs. In sum, this reduces the new payoffs for China 
and EU respectively to $ 629006 billion and $ 1406021 billion, while USA’s new payoff 
equals $ 1957737 billion.  
One of the benefits of using the Gamma core is that it exploits the players’ willingness to 
pay. We know that players most harmed will have larger incentives to invest in abatement, 
while countries not affected by climate change, don’t have the same incentives to participate. 
Given these characteristics, it is easier to find a solution in the core. And when we check 
whether the proposed payoffs here are in the core, we find that they are meeting all the 
necessary demands to be a core solution. In other words, using cooperative game theory 
combined with the Gamma core method, we find a solution that is efficient, unique and 
stable over time.   
There are numerous different methods of profit sharing and I will now illustrate some of 
these. For most of the time, I will look at increased payoffs when moving from the Nash 
equilibrium to the grand coalition. The net gain is then $ 21144 billion which is to be divided 
between the different players according to a distribution formula.  
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One possible solution which is not very different from the Shapley value is to look at the 
marginal contribution when USA is included in the Nash equilibrium coalition. Due to 
USA’s participation, the total payoffs increase and USA therefore receive all of the 
additional gains by adding the marginal contribution to their Nash equilibrium payoff, which 
is shown in the table below:  
 
The solution is not in the core because EU has incentives to free ride while the two 
remaining countries abate. EU’s strong incentives to free ride and the fact that many profit 
sharing agreements favour USA or China, results in many of the methods proposed here not 
being in the core.  
Profit sharing based on marginal 
contribution China US EU
Marginal contribution 0 21 144 0
New payoff 624385 1975544 1392835
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The following table shows a summary of different profit sharing methods:  
1. Profit sharing based on current 
emissions China USA EU
Emissions 6103493 5752289 3914359
Share of total 38.70 % 36.48 % 24.82 %
Profit allocation 8183 7713 5248
New payoff 632 568 1 962 113 1 398 083
2. Profit sharing based on historic 
cumulative emissions  
Share of cumulative emissions 12.0 % 46.2 % 41.8 %
Profit allocation 2535 9772 8838
New payoff 626 919 1 964 172 1 401 673
3. Profit sharing based on population 
Population (millions) 1338.6 307.2 491.6
Share of total 62.63 % 14.37 % 23.00 %
Profit allocation 13242 3039 4863
New payoff 637 627 1 957 439 1 397 698
4. Profit sharing based on GDP 
GDP 8791 14260 14510
Share of total 23.40 % 37.96 % 38.63 %
Profit allocation 4949 8027 8168
New payoff 629 333 1 962 427 1 401 003
5. Profit sharing based on marginal 
damages 
Marginal damage 24.30 15.10 19.50
Share of total 41.26 % 25.64 % 33.11 %
Profit allocation 8723 5421 7000
New payoff 633 108 1 959 821 1 399 835
6. Profit sharing based on equal 
shares 
Share of total 33.33 % 33.33 % 33.33 %
Profit allocation 7048 7048 7048
New payoff 631 433 1 961 448 1 399 883
 
The first proposed profit sharing method is to use share of current emissions to allocate 
profits. An argument for using this alternative is that it compensates the large polluters, 
making it easier for these countries to implement emission reductions. This method favours 
China and USA since they have the largest emissions today.  
The second alternative is to look at the historic cumulative emissions. The concentration of 
CO2 in the atmosphere is a result of emissions over many years. Since USA and EU were 
industrialized much earlier than China, they are more responsible for the present situation. 
As we also know, these countries find it least attractive to participate in the grand coalition 
and we should therefore give them a large share of the gains to motivate participation. This 
is hardly fair, but it will give USA and EU an incentive in the right direction.  
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The third option is to divide the increased payoffs according to each country’s share of total 
population, where a large country will get a larger share compared to smaller countries. This 
favours China greatly since they have a population that is more than 2.5 times larger than 
number two.  
Alternative 4, is to look at GDP where each country receives a share of the gains according 
to their share of total GDP. This gives larger shares to USA and EU and could therefore lead 
to full cooperation.  
From a fairness perspective, the most harmed countries should get a larger share of the gains. 
When looking at marginal damages, this favours China and EU, while USA gets the least. In 
this fifth alternative, the countries responsible for climate change get a smaller share 
compared to the more innocent China. This is in many ways more fair compared to for 
instance alternative 2.  
In the last alternative the profit is divided in equal shares between the players. This can be 
reasonable when considering combination of current and historic emissions, size of 
population and GDP. For these factors, the countries shift between being first, second and 
third. To allocate one third of the total increase in payoff to each country therefore sounds 
reasonable.  
One matter is to look at different alternatives in a perspective of fairness or what is believed 
to be reasonable. Another is to look at whether it is possible to implement and stable over 
time. All of the proposed alternatives are profit sharing methods that are possible to 
implement. However, they are not attractive solutions if they are not in the core. This turns 
out to be true for all alternatives. There is one particular problem, and that is to find a profit 
sharing method that ensures participation from EU. In neither alternative it is individually 
rational for EU to stay in the grand coalition as they can do better if they break out and free 
ride.  
The reason why it is so difficult to find a solution where EU doesn’t want to break out is due 
to their strong incentives for free riding. The payoff that they will receive from free riding is 
close to their initial noncooperative grand coalition payoff. Many of the methods above give 
a larger share of the payoffs to USA or China, which means that it is not individually rational 
for EU to stay in the grand coalition.  
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I will therefore suggest one profit sharing method that solves this problem. This method is 
based on giving all players their minimum payoff that makes it individually rational to stay 
in the grand coalition and the remaining profits to be shared among the players. This method 
is not dependent on the Nash equilibrium, only the minimum individual payoffs. The 
remaining profits can be shared according to any of the methods proposed above. Below, I 
have used equal shares of the remaining surplus, in the same way as alternative 6.  
Profit sharing based on minimum 
individual payoff and equal share of 
surplus China USA EU
Minimum payoff 623 337 1 954 400 1 405 492
Remaining profit 9534.21   
Share 33.33 % 33.33 % 33.33 %
Profit allocation 3178 3178 3178
New payoff 626 515 1 957 578 1 408 670
 
This is a core solution and therefore a possible method that will be stable over time. 
However, a possible problem is to figure out the exact minimum individual payoffs.  
The last scenario, using a 12.5% damage cost and a discount rate of 3% shows that the Nash 
equilibrium is not the efficient solution. However, the efficient solution is attainable by 
profit sharing and the only two methods of profit sharing that have proven to be in the core, 
are the Gamma core and the method using minimum individual payoffs and share the 
remaining surplus.  
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3.4 Sensitivity analysis 
Many of the parameters used in the model are highly uncertain, especially in the far future. 
This is true for parameters such as the discount rate, damage coefficient and the growth rate. 
An analysis of the different parameters and how they affect the results is therefore justified. 
In addition to this we have seen that China differs from the other countries both when it 
comes to growth rates and marginal damages. In light of this, it is interesting to examine 
what the important determinants for China’s strategy are. In this section I will address the 
discount rate, damage coefficient, growth rate and marginal damages in detail.  
We have already seen the importance of the discount rate. In scenario 2, where the discount 
rate equalled 4%, we had two Nash equilibria and an empty core. In scenario 3 the discount 
rate was reduced to 3% and all other parameters were kept equal. This resulted in one Nash 
equilibrium and a non-empty core. The future damages are more important when the 
discount rate is lower and this makes cooperation easier. The opposite is true if we increase 
the discount rate which makes it harder to reach full participation.   
In the model we have assumed the damage coefficient to be 1.5, now we change it to be 2 
and 1 and examine how the results change. A damage coefficient larger than 1 tells us that 
some abatement is a lot better than no abatement at all and that there are diminishing 
marginal benefit of abatement. While a coefficient equal to 1 suggests that the damage cost 
function is linear, or in other words, all abatement gives equal benefit. The table below 
summarizes the results given a damage coefficient of 2.  
Period 2009-2055 2056-2075 2076-2105 2106-     
World damages in % of GDP 0.0 % 12.5 % 12.5 % 12.5 %     
Damage coefficient 2.00           
Discount rate (k) 3.0 %           
       
Coalition Total payoff V(u)-V(Ø) China USA EU   
V(CH, US, EU) 3 992 764 191 432 631 358 1 953 499 1 407 907 Efficient solution 
V(CH, EU) 3 987 775 186 443 627 571 1 960 483 1 399 721 Nash equilibrium 
V(CH, US) 3 987 764 186 432 628 362 1 947 746 1 411 656 Nash equilibrium 
V(US, EU) 3 954 340 153 008 627 627 1 937 260 1 389 453   
V(CH) 3 948 585 147 253 617 843 1 941 834 1 388 908   
V(US) 3 898 120 96 788 614 533 1 912 215 1 371 371   
V(EU) 3 891 742 90 411 612 467 1 922 578 1 356 698   
V(Ø) 3 801 332 0 592 641 1 884 637 1 324 054   
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Comparing this table with the one from scenario 3, where the damage coefficient is 1.5, we 
get two Nash equilibria instead of one. However, the two Nash equilibria are as before not 
the efficient solution. The Nash equilibrium is found using the same method as before. In 
addition to this, EU no longer maximizes their individual payoff in the grand coalition, but 
they want to free ride while the two remaining countries abate. The benefit of some 
abatement, increase with the higher damage coefficient.  
Reducing the damage coefficient to 1, gives the following results:  
Period 2009-2055 2056-2075 2076-2105 2106-     
World damages in % of GDP 0.0 % 12.5 % 12.5 % 12.5 %     
Damage coefficient 1.00           
Discount rate (k) 3.0 %           
       
Coalition Total payoff V(u)-V(Ø) China USA EU   
V(CH, US, EU) 3 992 764 191 432 631 358 1 953 499 1 407 907 Nash equilibrium 
V(CH, US) 3 945 059 143 727 619 947 1 931 652 1 393 460   
V(CH, EU) 3 941 875 140 544 618 518 1 943 202 1 380 155   
V(US, EU) 3 899 925 98 594 616 891 1 916 781 1 366 253   
V(CH) 3 894 170 92 839 607 107 1 921 355 1 365 708   
V(US) 3 852 220 50 888 605 480 1 894 934 1 351 806   
V(EU) 3 849 037 47 705 604 052 1 906 484 1 338 501   
V(Ø) 3 801 332 0 592 641 1 884 637 1 324 054   
 
The Nash equilibrium is achieved by the grand coalition and this is also the efficient 
solution. Consequently, a lower coefficient makes it easier to ensure full participation. When 
abatement is only a fraction of full abatement, the damages are higher when the damage 
coefficient is low. A high damage coefficient makes it more difficult to reach full 
cooperation, while the opposite is true for a low coefficient.  
Another important parameter is the different countries’ growth rates. I have used estimates 
from Nordhaus, but large uncertainties are attached to these numbers as they are so far into 
the future. To examine how the growth rate affects the results I have reduced all the 
countries growth rates to half.  
 
 
 
 40 
Growth rate       
Period 2009-2055 2056-2075 2076-2105 2106-   
China 1.96 % 0.63 % 0.63 % 0.15 %     
USA 1.02 % 0.54 % 0.54 % 0.15 %     
EU 0.93 % 0.45 % 0.45 % 0.15 %     
Global warming impacts             
Period 2009-2055 2056-2075 2076-2105 2106-     
World damages in % of GDP 0.0 % 12.5 % 12.5 % 12.5 %     
Damage coefficient 1.50           
Discount rate (k) 3.0 %           
       
Coalition Total payoff V(u)-V(Ø) China USA EU   
V(CH, US, EU) 2 700 782 81 025 293 781 1 390 917 1 016 084 Efficient solution 
V(CH, EU) 2 690 586 70 829 289 824 1 393 256 1 007 506 Nash equilibrium 
V(CH, US) 2 689 336 69 579 290 104 1 383 810 1 015 422   
V(US, EU) 2 683 887 64 130 292 271 1 383 679 1 007 938   
V(CH) 2 663 030 43 273 282 987 1 380 048 999 995   
V(EU) 2 657 414 37 658 285 118 1 379 860 992 436   
V(US) 2 656 748 36 991 285 515 1 370 632 1 000 602   
V(Ø) 2 619 757 0 276 299 1 362 828 980 629   
 
The results are little affected by the change in growth rates. The Nash equilibrium is the 
coalition of China and EU and the efficient solution is the grand coalition. It is worth 
noticing that the Nash equilibrium is second best alternative measures in total payoffs, 
compared to third from before.  
The small differences suggest that the change in growth path has little impacts on the results. 
However, it may be interesting to examine what happens if we change the relative growth 
instead. Take for instance China, they have a dominant strategy which is different compared 
to the other two. China’s parameters also differ from the other two, they have a higher 
growth path and a larger share of marginal damages. In the first scenario, China’s growth 
path is equal to USA’s growth path. The results are summarized below:  
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China             
Period 2009-2055 2056-2075 2076-2105 2106-     
Growth of net national income 2.04 % 1.08 % 1.08 % 0.29 %     
       
Period 2009-2055 2056-2075 2076-2105 2106-     
World damages in % of GDP 0.0 % 12.5 % 12.5 % 12.5 %     
Damage coefficient 1.50           
Discount rate (k) 3.0 %           
       
Coalition Total payoff V(u)-V(Ø) China USA EU   
V(CH, US, EU) 3 684 587 136 262 323 181 1 953 499 1 407 907 Nash equilibrium 
V(US, EU) 3 667 118 118 793 321 692 1 946 005 1 399 421   
V(CH, US) 3 660 297 111 972 316 391 1 940 472 1 403 434   
V(CH, EU) 3 657 688 109 363 315 078 1 952 235 1 390 375   
V(US) 3 621 234 72 909 310 651 1 924 839 1 385 744   
V(EU) 3 616 734 68 409 308 962 1 935 897 1 371 875   
V(CH) 3 602 214 53 889 302 149 1 927 453 1 372 611   
V(Ø) 3 548 325 0 293 487 1 906 239 1 348 599   
 
Reducing China’s growth path leads to interesting differences. As we can see from the table 
above, the reduction leads to Nash equilibrium which is the grand coalition and this is also 
the efficient solution. Now, all of the countries maximize their individual payoffs by 
cooperating. The second best alternative measured in total payoff is the coalition of USA and 
EU. The results are very dependent on China’s growth rate and this is probably due to the 
fact that abatement is calculated as a share of GDP. A lower growth in GDP leads to a 
reduction in abatement and this also reduces China’s importance for total world abatement. 
This can also be seen from the changes in the net present value of abatement in the grand 
coalition which is summarized in the following table:  
  China China (low growth) USA EU 
NPV abatement 6944 3513 5699 5356 
 
China’s net present value (NPV) of abatement has been reduced from $ 6994 billion to $ 
3513 billion. The relative change means that China has moved from being the largest to the 
smallest country in terms of abatement. And this also suggests why the coalition of USA and 
EU now is a better alternative than any of the two-country coalitions including China.  
China’s marginal damages also differs from USA and EU. To look at the marginal damages’ 
impact on the results, the shares of damages are now changed to being equal for all 
countries. This provides the following results:  
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Share of damages             
China's share of damages 33.33 %           
US' share of damages 33.33 %           
EU's share of damages 33.33 %           
Sum 100 %           
       
Global warming impacts             
Period 2009-2055 2056-2075 2076-2105 2106-     
World damages in % of GDP 0.0 % 12.5 % 12.5 % 12.5 %     
Damage coefficient 1.50           
Discount rate (k) 3 %           
       
Coalition Total payoff V(u)-V(Ø) China USA EU   
V(CH, US, EU) 3 992 764 208 634 631 358 1 953 499 1 407 907 Nash equilibrium 
V(CH, US) 3 970 969 186 839 626 636 1 938 926 1 405 407   
V(CH, EU) 3 968 861 184 731 625 724 1 950 404 1 392 733   
V(US, EU) 3 927 556 143 426 625 804 1 921 755 1 379 998   
V(CH) 3 918 145 134 015 616 733 1 922 684 1 378 729   
V(US) 3 866 991 82 861 615 353 1 889 572 1 362 066   
V(EU) 3 861 138 77 007 613 881 1 899 367 1 347 889   
V(Ø) 3 784 130 0 601 005 1 859 706 1 323 420   
 
The Nash equilibrium is also here the grand coalition and it is the efficient solution. China’s 
strong incentive to invest in abatement is reduced because their marginal damages are lower. 
The opposite is true for USA, where the marginal damage has increased. They therefore have 
a stronger incentive to abate and the grand coalition is easier to obtain.  
Another aspect worth mentioning is the relative improvements compared to the business as 
usual scenarios. In the table below the efficient solution and the Nash equilibrium from each 
scenario is compared to the business as usual results.  
Scenario Efficient solution 
Relative improvement 
compared to business as 
usual 
Nash 
equilibrium 
Relative improvement 
compared to business as 
usual 
Scenario 1 V(CH, EU) 0.89 % V(CH) 0.76 %
Scenario 2 V(CH, US, EU) 3.09 % V(CH, EU) 2.85 %
Scenario 3 V(CH, US, EU) 5.04 % V(CH, EU) 4.48 %
 
From the first scenario we see that the gains are less than 1% compared to business as usual. 
The difference between the Nash equilibrium and the efficient solution is also marginal.  
Increasing the damages leads to a larger difference between business as usual and the Nash 
equilibrium and the efficient solution. From scenario 2 the payoffs increase by 2.85% in the 
Nash equilibrium and 3.09% in the efficient solution. The difference between the Nash 
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equilibrium and the efficient solution is small. This is perhaps why it is difficult to reach the 
efficient solution for this scenario. In the last scenario the Nash equilibrium is an 
improvement of 4.48% and the efficient solution 5.04% compared to business as usual. The 
difference between the two is now more than 0.5%. This is a significant improvement. It also 
supports the results from the profit sharing where it was shown that full cooperation is 
possible.   
The choice of parameters significantly affects the results. Both the damage coefficient, 
relative changes in growth rates and shares of marginal damages gives very different results 
compared to the scenarios discussed earlier. From the differences between scenario 2 and 3 it 
was clear that the choice of discount rate also is important for the results. A high discount 
rate means that future damages are less important for the net present value. This makes 
cooperation more difficult. Changing the growth rate equally for all countries will not affect 
the results significantly. Considering the different parameter’s impact on the results it is 
important to be critical to how they are used.  
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3.5 Discussion 
We have now looked at the model and results according to different scenarios. In the first 
scenario the damages were low. This led to a Nash equilibrium where China abated alone. 
The efficient solution is the coalition between China and EU. This coalition, however, is 
quite unrealistic since it involves the free rider, USA, to pay EU to be a part of the coalition.  
In the second scenario, the damages were increased. Now we had two Nash equilibria, the 
coalitions of China and USA and China and EU. Using the theory of focal points, the 
coalition of China and EU is viewed to be the most realistic solution, based on marginal 
damages. However, the efficient solution, in this case the grand coalition, proved to have an 
empty core. Reaching full participation will therefore be very difficult and must be supported 
by other means than economic perspectives alone.  
In the third scenario the damages remained high, but the discount rate was lowered. The 
Nash equilibrium now consisted of the coalition between China and EU. The grand coalition 
is the efficient solution and the core is nonempty. Evaluating different methods of profit 
sharing proved few of them to be in the core. Two methods were proposed that were in the 
core, the Gamma core and the individual payoffs with sharing the remaining profits.  
The results are quite clear when it comes to China’s role, they prefer to abate, preferably in a 
coalition with one or two other players. EU wants to abate if the level of damages is high 
enough or the rate of discount is low enough. The player with largest incentives to free ride 
is USA, who in most cases wants to act alone and not be a part of any coalition. However, if 
we use a low discount rate and high damage costs they can be interested in participating if 
they receive a large share of the total profits. In this section, I will turn to a discussion of 
these results and how they fit with what we observe in the real world.  
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In the aftermath of the Copenhagen Accord, China, USA and EU submitted their targets for 
carbon emission reductions. These are summarized in the following table:  
Country Emission reduction in 2020 
Base 
year 
China Lower its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 40-45% 2005 
USA 
In the range of 17%, in conformity with anticipated U.S. energy and climate 
legislation, recognizing that the final target will be reported to the Secretariat in light 
of enacted legislation. 2005 
EU 20/30% 1990 
Source: UNFCCC.  
China announced that they will reduce their carbon intensity by 40-45% compared to 2005. 
According to Bryony Worthington, director of Sandbag, a campaigning organisation focused 
on emissions trading, this “actually only amounts to a cut of between zero and 12% off 
business as usual emissions in 2020 (…). That is roughly a 40% increase in CO2 emissions 
on current levels” (The Guardian, 26.11.09). Even if the target sounds quite promising, the 
reductions are dismal due to large economic growth. The growth rate in GDP, which is 
expected to be substantially higher than the 3.9% used in the model above for the years until 
2020, makes it easy to meet the carbon intensity goal as long as the growth comes without 
large increase in emissions.  
According to Climate Action Tracker the emission reduction targets introduced by China are 
inadequate to keep the global temperature rise to 2°C. Climate Action Tracker is a 
cooperation between Ecofys, Climate Analytics and Postdam Institute for Climate Impact 
Research and it is led by Dr. Niklas Höhne, one of the lead scientists at the IPCC. Climate 
Action Tracker has evaluated all countries participating in the Copenhagen Accord and their 
emission reduction targets, including China. In addition to the carbon intensity target, China 
has stated that they will increase the share of renewable energy consumption to 15%. 
According to Climate Action Tracker this does not include the “15% non-fossil fuel target by 
2020 due to lack of information. Its inclusion could improve the rating”. The increased 
demand for renewable energy has spurred China to invest in renewables. And as The 
Economist explains it, this gives positive results, “[h]ydropower will expand by more than 
half (…). Wind power will see a big expansion, (…) as will nuclear (…). The rest will come 
from such niches as solar panels and incinerators” (29.04.2010). 
China has been accused of being more concerned of economic growth than the environment. 
This may be a reasonable concern if they believe that becoming richer may lead to a lower 
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marginal damage due to shifts in the industry. As mentioned above, when a country becomes 
richer, more people will be working in sectors that are less dependent on the climate. This is 
not reflected in the model above since the marginal damages are constant over time. In line 
with China’s concern for their economic growth, they were accused of stalling the 
negotiations in Copenhagen 2009, or as Mark Lynas, an environmentalist and climate change 
author present during the final negotiations, argues “China wrecked the talks” (The 
Guardian, 22.12.2009). By postponing an international environmental agreement China can 
continue to grow its economy based on using coal.  
The United States has announced that they will reduce their carbon emissions by 17% by 
2020 based on 2005 level. However, this target is conditional on approval from the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. A climate bill that may lead to the necessary reductions to 
meet the 17% target was passed in the House of Representatives in June 2009. A similar bill 
is pending in the Senate but to the Economist (13.05.2010) one of the writers of the bill, “Mr 
Graham says [that] the bill does not have the votes”. In other words, it seems difficult for 
USA to implement the necessary legislation to carry through significant emission reductions. 
The Climate Action Tracker rates USA’s efforts as inadequate. 
EU, on the other hand, has announced a target to reduce their emissions with 20% by 2020 
based on 1990 level. In their application to be associated with the Copenhagen Accord, they 
have also said that they will increase their cuts to 30% “provided that other developed 
countries commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and that developing 
countries contribute adequately according to their responsibilities and respective 
capabilities” (2010). To implement the necessary cuts EU has among other measures 
introduced a cap and trade system for CO2 emissions. EU is often claimed to be one of the 
leading nations of significant size battling climate change.  
But is the EU target really as ambitious as it might sound? The actual EU cuts compared to 
USA are, according to Worthington: “Europe – minus 11.7%; US – minus 17.3%” (The 
Guardian, 26.11.2009) compared to the 2007 emission levels. And if EU increase their 
emission reductions to 30% compared to the 1990 level this equals a “22% cut on 2007” 
(The Guardian, 26.11.2009). EU has not chosen 1990 as their base year without reason. In 
the beginning of the 1990s, the emissions decreased significantly in the Former Soviet Union 
due to lower activity. Many of these countries are today members of EU and their emissions 
figures are included in the total emission figures for EU. EU therefore have a base year with 
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high emissions, which then dropped significantly in the early 1990s, making it easier to meet 
the proposed emission target. This is also reflected in the Climate Action Tracker’s 
evaluation of EU’s 20% emission reductions target which is rated inadequate. Also, the 
Climate Action Tracker argues that “if [EU] were to adopt the conditional commitment of -
30%, it would reach the Medium category”.  
At the moment, it seems like none of the three countries, China, USA and EU, are doing 
what the IPCC believe is necessary. This may be due to three factors.  Firstly, the countries 
may have concluded that the possible damages are small compared to the benefits and that 
they therefore find it difficult to implement strong measures. Second, there are other factors 
more important than economics that are being considered, for instance politics, trade and 
fairness. Third, the incentives to free ride are large, making it difficult to agree on any treaty 
that leads to higher participation and increased emission reductions.  
The three arguments above may be the explanation to why we experience small carbon 
reductions and little willingness for cooperation. However, I believe it is worth mentioning 
that China’s announced emission reductions target is only until 2020. What they will do after 
this period is still uncertain. At the moment, this target implies that China is not willing to do 
any large emission reductions that may affect their economic growth. At the same time, the 
Chinese renewable energy sector is booming and this may be helpful in the future. A large 
renewable sector may help China to a position where large cuts are more easily 
implemented. It can therefore not be excluded that China will do substantial emission 
reductions in the future.  
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4. Conclusion 
In analysing the question of how the world would handle global warming if the world only 
consisted of China, USA and EU, there are some factors standing out. First, the choice of 
parameters is very important for what results we will have. Second, the model predicts that 
China will abate no matter what, that EU will be the second country to join the coalition and 
that USA will have to be paid to participate in the coalition. Is this reflected in what we see 
in today’s real world? And third, can this simplified model be used to explain the behaviour 
of the three countries in a much more complex real world and are the results really 
significant?  
The two most important parameters are the damage costs and the discount rate. The level of 
damage costs is highly uncertain. No one really knows for sure how large the damages will 
be, when they will occur or who will be the most affected. We have models that indicate the 
damage costs, such as the IPCC’s models or Nordhaus’ RICE-model, but also in these 
models there are high uncertainties as it is difficult to predict the damages 100 to 200 years 
from now.  
By changing the discount rate from 4% to 3%, the core became non-empty and the efficient 
solution proved to be reachable. Considering the discount rate’s impact on the results, it is 
important to be critical to what discount rate is used in various models, as illustrated in the 
scenarios.  
Today, there are little or no signals from China that they will abate no matter what. They 
have been accused of stalling the climate negotiations. Furthermore, they have committed 
themselves to reduce their carbon intensity, which does not necessarily mean any emission 
reductions. Meanwhile, China plans to increase their share of renewable energy 
consumption. This may be motivated by other means than carbon emissions, but it may also 
make it easier for China to make substantial emission reductions in the future.  
The model implies that EU will join China in a coalition and invest in abatement if the 
damages are high enough. EU definitely has some momentum in their climate policies, but 
their 20% target falls short of what the IPCC believes is needed. However, they already have 
some of the necessary measures in place, such as the European Trading Scheme (ETS) for 
carbon trading, and if they implement their 30% target this is very positive. 
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USA has signalled that they want to implement substantial emission reductions, but they are 
facing problems in getting the necessary legislation in place. Until this is obtained, there is 
no reason to believe that they will succeed in achieving significant emission reductions. This 
is in line with what the model predicts. Even though there are few signs that China and EU 
are willing to pay USA to be a part of a coalition, this does not mean that the solution is 
impossible. The results from the high damage and low discount rate scenario are therefore 
interesting to consider.  
The model presented in this paper is a simplification of the real world based on many 
assumptions. The results must therefore be critically viewed and used with necessary 
caution. However, the model gives a clear indication about the issues the global society is 
facing when addressing global warming and possible solutions. This is shown by how the 
results may change according to different choices of scenarios and parameters.  
If believing that the damages from global warming will be low, for instance equal to a 
reduction in consumption of 5% from 2056, this will not lead to any motivation for 
cooperation. In such a case, the differences in total payoffs between business as usual, the 
Nash equilibrium and the efficient solution are very small and probably not worth the effort. 
On the other hand, if the damages are believed to be large, the gains from cooperation will 
be significant and a coalition of two or three countries will be much easier to obtain.  
In my opinion, the model gives valuable insight. Though, the international negotiations so 
far have not achieved much, the policy makers’ opinions may change quickly if we get a 
more certain picture of the possible damages. I therefore believe the model can explain some 
of both the current and possible future behaviour. In the coming decade, it will be especially 
interesting to see how the expected damages develop and observe the impact this may have 
on cooperation. 
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5. Appendix 
5.1 Appendix 1 
The payoff to country i is the net present value of the net consumption and it is calculated as 
follows:  
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ig       - Growth rate in country i in period t 
t
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is       - Country i’s share of world damages 
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tu   - Rate of necessary investment  
k       - Discount rate 
t
ir       - Savings rate in country i in period t 
α       - Damage coefficient 
t
iv       - Population growth rate in country i in period t 
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5.2 Appendix 2 
Non-cooperative grand coalition China USA EU 
V(CH, US, EU) 631 358 1 953 499 1 407 907
 
Coalition Constraints Payoff here Stability? (1=Yes, 0=No
V(CH, US, EU) 3 992 764 3 992 764 1
V(CH, US) 2 567 803 2 584 856 1
V(CH, EU) 2 017 219 2 039 265 1
V(US, EU) 3 309 267 3 361 406 1
V(CH) 613 255 631 358 1
V(US) 1 904 328 1 953 499 1
V(EU) 1 348 291 1 407 907 1
Payoff breaking out(CH) 623 337 631 358 1
Payoff breaking out(US) 1 954 400 1 953 499 0
Payoff breaking out(EU) 1 405 492 1 407 907 1
Payoff breaking out(US, EU) 3 312 071 3 361 406 1
Payoff breaking out(CH, EU) 1 972 842 2 039 265 1
Payoff breaking out(CH, US) 2 523 723 2 584 856 1
Sum   Non-core solution
 
The first part of the table describes the payoff received by each country. Here China receives 
$ 631 358 billion, USA $ 1 953 499 billion and EU $ 1 407 907 billion. In the next part of 
the table the different constraints that must be fulfilled for the solution to be in the core are 
summarized. These summarize the collective, coalitional and individual rationality. If the 
constraint is fulfilled, or in other words, payoff here is larger than the constraint, the solution 
is stable (marked 1). If the constraint is not fulfilled the solution is unstable (marked 0) and it 
is a non-core solution. All constraints must be fulfilled for the solution to be in the core. This 
is the same for all of the following tables.  
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Profit sharing based on the Shapley 
value China USA EU
Shapley value 94 006 50 421 47 005
New payoff 686647 1935058 1371059
 
Coalition Constraints Payoff here
Stability? (1=Yes, 
0=No
V(CH, US, EU) 3 992 764 3 992 764 1
V(CH, US) 2 567 803 2 621 705 1
V(CH, EU) 2 017 219 2 057 706 1
V(US, EU) 3 309 267 3 306 117 0
V(CH) 613 255 686 647 1
V(US) 1 904 328 1 935 058 1
V(EU) 1 348 291 1 371 059 1
Payoff breaking out(CH) 623 337 686 647 1
Payoff breaking out(US) 1 954 400 1 935 058 0
Payoff breaking out(EU) 1 405 492 1 371 059 0
Payoff breaking out(US, EU) 3 312 071 3 306 117 0
Payoff breaking out(CH, EU) 1 972 842 2 057 706 1
Payoff breaking out(CH, US) 2 523 723 2 621 705 1
Sum   Non-core solution
 
 
Profit sharing based on Gamma core China USA EU
Money transfer 2 351 4 238 1 887
New payoff 629 006 1 957 737 1 406 021
 
Coalition Constraints Payoff here Stability? (1=Yes, 0=No
V(CH, US, EU) 3 992 764 3 992 764 1
V(CH, US) 2 567 803 2 586 743 1
V(CH, EU) 2 017 219 2 035 027 1
V(US, EU) 3 309 267 3 363 757 1
V(CH) 613 255 629 006 1
V(US) 1 904 328 1 957 737 1
V(EU) 1 348 291 1 406 021 1
Payoff breaking out(CH) 623 337 629 006 1
Payoff breaking out(US) 1 954 400 1 957 737 1
Payoff breaking out(EU) 1 405 492 1 406 021 1
Payoff breaking out(US, EU) 3 312 071 3 363 757 1
Payoff breaking out(CH, EU) 1 972 842 2 035 027 1
Payoff breaking out(CH, US) 2 523 723 2 586 743 1
Sum   Core solution
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Profit sharing based on marginal 
contribution China US EU
Marginal contribution 0 21 144 0
New payoff 624385 1975544 1392835
 
Coalition Constraints Payoff here
Stability? (1=Yes, 
0=No
V(CH, US, EU) 3 992 764 3 992 764 1
V(CH, US) 2 567 803 2 599 929 1
V(CH, EU) 2 017 219 2 017 219 1
V(US, EU) 3 309 267 3 368 379 1
V(CH) 613 255 624 385 1
V(US) 1 904 328 1 975 544 1
V(EU) 1 348 291 1 392 835 1
Payoff breaking out(CH) 623 337 624 385 1
Payoff breaking out(US) 1 954 400 1 975 544 1
Payoff breaking out(EU) 1 405 492 1 392 835 0
Payoff breaking out(US, EU) 3 312 071 3 368 379 1
Payoff breaking out(CH, EU) 1 972 842 2 017 219 1
Payoff breaking out(CH, US) 2 523 723 2 599 929 1
Sum   Non-core solution
 
 
Profit sharing based on current 
emissions China USA EU
Emissions 6103493 5752289 3914359
Share of total 38,70 % 36,48 % 24,82 %
Profit allocation 8183 7713 5248
New payoff 632 568 1 962 113 1 398 083
 
Coalition Constraints Payoff here Stability? (1=Yes, 0=No
V(CH, US, EU) 3 992 764 3 992 764 1
V(CH, US) 2 567 803 2 594 681 1
V(CH, EU) 2 017 219 2 030 651 1
V(US, EU) 3 309 267 3 360 196 1
V(CH) 613 255 632 568 1
V(US) 1 904 328 1 962 113 1
V(EU) 1 348 291 1 398 083 1
Payoff breaking out(CH) 623 337 632 568 1
Payoff breaking out(US) 1 954 400 1 962 113 1
Payoff breaking out(EU) 1 405 492 1 398 083 0
Payoff breaking out(US, EU) 3 312 071 3 360 196 1
Payoff breaking out(CH, EU) 1 972 842 2 030 651 1
Payoff breaking out(CH, US) 2 523 723 2 594 681 1
Sum   Non-core solution
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Profit sharing based on historic 
cumulative emissions  China USA EU
Share of cumulative emissions 12,0 % 46,2 % 41,8 %
Profit allocation 2535 9772 8838
New payoff 626 919 1 964 172 1 401 673
 
Coalition Constraints Payoff here Stability? (1=Yes, 0=No
V(CH, US, EU) 3 992 764 3 992 764 1
V(CH, US) 2 567 803 2 591 091 1
V(CH, EU) 2 017 219 2 028 592 1
V(US, EU) 3 309 267 3 365 845 1
V(CH) 613 255 626 919 1
V(US) 1 904 328 1 964 172 1
V(EU) 1 348 291 1 401 673 1
Payoff breaking out(CH) 623 337 626 919 1
Payoff breaking out(US) 1 954 400 1 964 172 1
Payoff breaking out(EU) 1 405 492 1 401 673 0
Payoff breaking out(US, EU) 3 312 071 3 365 845 1
Payoff breaking out(CH, EU) 1 972 842 2 028 592 1
Payoff breaking out(CH, US) 2 523 723 2 591 091 1
Sum   Non-core solution
 
Profit sharing based on population China USA EU
Population (millions) 1338,6 307,2 491,6
Share of total 62,63 % 14,37 % 23,00 %
Profit allocation 13242 3039 4863
New payoff 637 627 1 957 439 1 397 698
 
Coalition Constraints Payoff here Stability? (1=Yes, 0=No
V(CH, US, EU) 3 992 764 3 992 764 1
V(CH, US) 2 567 803 2 595 066 1
V(CH, EU) 2 017 219 2 035 325 1
V(US, EU) 3 309 267 3 355 137 1
V(CH) 613 255 637 627 1
V(US) 1 904 328 1 957 439 1
V(EU) 1 348 291 1 397 698 1
Payoff breaking out(CH) 623 337 637 627 1
Payoff breaking out(US) 1 954 400 1 957 439 1
Payoff breaking out(EU) 1 405 492 1 397 698 0
Payoff breaking out(US, EU) 3 312 071 3 355 137 1
Payoff breaking out(CH, EU) 1 972 842 2 035 325 1
Payoff breaking out(CH, US) 2 523 723 2 595 066 1
Sum   Non-core solution
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Profit sharing based on GDP China USA EU
GDP 8791 14260 14510
Share of total 23,40 % 37,96 % 38,63 %
Profit allocation 4949 8027 8168
New payoff 629 333 1 962 427 1 401 003
 
Coalition Constraints Payoff here Stability? (1=Yes, 0=No
V(CH, US, EU) 3 992 764 3 992 764 1
V(CH, US) 2 567 803 2 591 761 1
V(CH, EU) 2 017 219 2 030 336 1
V(US, EU) 3 309 267 3 363 430 1
V(CH) 613 255 629 333 1
V(US) 1 904 328 1 962 427 1
V(EU) 1 348 291 1 401 003 1
Payoff breaking out(CH) 623 337 629 333 1
Payoff breaking out(US) 1 954 400 1 962 427 1
Payoff breaking out(EU) 1 405 492 1 401 003 0
Payoff breaking out(US, EU) 3 312 071 3 363 430 1
Payoff breaking out(CH, EU) 1 972 842 2 030 336 1
Payoff breaking out(CH, US) 2 523 723 2 591 761 1
Sum   Non-core solution
 
Profit sharing based on marginal 
damages China USA EU
Marginal damage 24,30 15,10 19,50
Share of total 41,26 % 25,64 % 33,11 %
Profit allocation 8723 5421 7000
New payoff 633 108 1 959 821 1 399 835
 
Coalition Constraints Payoff here Stability? (1=Yes, 0=No
V(CH, US, EU) 3 992 764 3 992 764 1
V(CH, US) 2 567 803 2 592 929 1
V(CH, EU) 2 017 219 2 032 943 1
V(US, EU) 3 309 267 3 359 656 1
V(CH) 613 255 633 108 1
V(US) 1 904 328 1 959 821 1
V(EU) 1 348 291 1 399 835 1
Payoff breaking out(CH) 623 337 633 108 1
Payoff breaking out(US) 1 954 400 1 959 821 1
Payoff breaking out(EU) 1 405 492 1 399 835 0
Payoff breaking out(US, EU) 3 312 071 3 359 656 1
Payoff breaking out(CH, EU) 1 972 842 2 032 943 1
Payoff breaking out(CH, US) 2 523 723 2 592 929 1
Sum   Non-core solution
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Profit sharing based on equal shares China USA EU
Share of total 33,33 % 33,33 % 33,33 %
Profit allocation 7048 7048 7048
New payoff 631 433 1 961 448 1 399 883
 
Coalition Constraints Payoff here Stability? (1=Yes, 0=No
V(CH, US, EU) 3 992 764 3 992 764 1
V(CH, US) 2 567 803 2 592 881 1
V(CH, EU) 2 017 219 2 031 316 1
V(US, EU) 3 309 267 3 361 331 1
V(CH) 613 255 631 433 1
V(US) 1 904 328 1 961 448 1
V(EU) 1 348 291 1 399 883 1
Payoff breaking out(CH) 623 337 631 433 1
Payoff breaking out(US) 1 954 400 1 961 448 1
Payoff breaking out(EU) 1 405 492 1 399 883 0
Payoff breaking out(US, EU) 3 312 071 3 361 331 1
Payoff breaking out(CH, EU) 1 972 842 2 031 316 1
Payoff breaking out(CH, US) 2 523 723 2 592 881 1
Sum   Non-core solution
 
 
Profit sharing based on minimum 
individual payoff and equal share of 
surplus China USA EU
Minimum payoff 623 337 1 954 400 1 405 492
Remaining profit 9534,21   
Share 33,33 % 33,33 % 33,33 %
Profit allocation 3178 3178 3178
New payoff 626 515 1 957 578 1 408 670
 
Coalition Constraints Payoff here Stability? (1=Yes, 0=No
V(CH, US, EU) 3 992 764 3 992 764 1
V(CH, US) 2 567 803 2 584 093 1
V(CH, EU) 2 017 219 2 035 186 1
V(US, EU) 3 309 267 3 366 248 1
V(CH) 613 255 626 515 1
V(US) 1 904 328 1 957 578 1
V(EU) 1 348 291 1 408 670 1
Payoff breaking out(CH) 623 337 626 515 1
Payoff breaking out(US) 1 954 400 1 957 578 1
Payoff breaking out(EU) 1 405 492 1 408 670 1
Payoff breaking out(US, EU) 3 312 071 3 366 248 1
Payoff breaking out(CH, EU) 1 972 842 2 035 186 1
Payoff breaking out(CH, US) 2 523 723 2 584 093 1
Sum   Core solution
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